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On the Significance of Psychodynamic Discourse for the
Field of Consciousness Studies
Robin S. Brown
Abstract: Despite the obvious confluence of concerns between psychodynamic
psychology and the emerging field of consciousness studies, the extent to which
psychodynamic thinking has factored into the consciousness literature has been
limited. With widespread interest in “the unconscious” having significantly
diminished, the present paper asks what might be implied in the shift towards the
notion of “consciousness”—what about this cross-disciplinary designation has
come to attract attention not only within the academic world, but also in the
popular press? That the term does indeed invite contributions from a variety of
disciplines makes the field both a meeting space, and a battleground. It is posited
that the field of consciousness studies can be considered both a reaction to, and a
reflection of, the evolving nature of psychoanalysis in the English-speaking
world. After demonstrating the ways in which depth psychological discourse is
implicated in the debates around consciousness, the author suggests why the
notion of an unconscious mind might profitably be adopted in the consciousness
literature. Stressing the clinical and ethical significance of an assumed capacity
for creative autonomy in individuals, this paper grounds itself in a fundamental
concern for the sociopolitical dimensions of the consciousness debates.
Keywords: consciousness, ethics, psychoanalysis, the unconscious

The widespread shift from psychological to biological models of mind has numerous
ostensible causes, not least of these being the
manifold pressures exerted on clinical practice
by the pharmaceutical industry. Nevertheless,
it should be admitted that a considerable share
of the responsibility must fall upon psychoanalysis itself. The field’s early concern for
questions of purity and fidelity to Freud engendered a constant political maneuvering so
as to delimit that which was properly deemed
“psychoanalytic.” Had this tendency occurred
under the banner of some broader and more

inclusive signifier, the consequences may have
been less adverse. Eugen Bleuler is credited
with having coined “depth
psychology” [Tiefenpsychologie] with just
such a view in mind (Ellenberger, 1970, p.
562). While this suggested appellation never
gained widespread currency1, Kohut
(1977) later adopted Bleuler’s designation in
attempting to keep his own ideas related to an
often hostile psychoanalytic mainstream.
Freud (1914) briefly acknowledges the term
only to state that it is directly equatable with
“psychoanalysis” (p. 41).
1
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More recently, the term has come to be
associated particularly with the Jungian
community; sometimes to the extent that the
notion is mistakenly thought synonymous
with analytical psychology itself. Despite the
efforts of those diverging from the Freudian
orthodoxy, in popular perception
psychoanalysis remains a far more widely
recognized designation than depth psychology,
and for this reason the less inclusive term
tends to significantly color perception of the
wider field. Recent efforts to re-evaluate the
origins of depth psychology have
demonstrated the extent to which Freud and
his followers distorted the field’s early history
so as to reinforce his position as founding
father (Shamdasani, 2004; Taylor, 2009). One
of the consequences of this tendency has been
to artificially divorce psychoanalytic thinking
from the wider history of Western ideas.
Because psychoanalysis has come to stand in
for a whole swathe of intellectual activity,
which it has at the same time disavowed, the
fate of the field has influenced the history of
ideas in ways that are complex and not always
immediately apparent. It might be said that
the Freudian legacy has, to a disproportionate
extent, carried with it the responsibility for
keeping alive the introspective approach to
psychology. Pessimistically, it could even be
argued that as a consequence of the slipshod
fashion in which the early profession handled
its affairs, the most significant influence
psychoanalysis has had on our perceptions
about the nature of mind in the present day
lies merely in the role that the field played in
hastening the rise of the biological
reductionism that it was originally established
largely in distinction to.
Coupled with the shift from a popular
interest in psychoanalytic thought and the
tropes of the unconscious to that of neurons
and chemical imbalances is the emergence of
a concern for the notion of consciousness per

se. Many of the frustrated and sometimes
contrary hopes attendant to the psychoanalytic
milieu seem now to be evidenced in the ways
in which this term has come to be deployed in
academic discourse. For some, the notion of
consciousness reflects nothing less than the
final field of inquiry waiting to be demystified
by scientific positivism. A recent New York
Times opinion piece by Princeton psychologist
Michael Graziano typifies this attitude.
Graziano (2014) confidently claims that there
are three great scientific questions pertaining
to the human condition: [1] what is our place
in the universe? [2] what is our place in life?
and [3] what is the relationship between mind
and matter? He argues that Copernicus and
Darwin have answered the first and second of
these questions, while contemporary
neuroscience is on the verge of answering the
third by disproving the existence of
consciousness altogether.
Although this
supposed dissolving of the idea of
consciousness is certainly nothing new,
Graziano’s particular framing of the question
is telling. He seeks to establish the notion of
consciousness as the ground upon which
Western science is to claim its final victory.
What is particularly striking about Graziano’s
way of phrasing things is that the form of his
argument is an unattributed reworking of a
claim that suggests something quite
different—not that science is about to settle
matters but, quite to the contrary, that
humanity’s place in the universe has been
thrown into radical doubt. While the names of
Newton and Darwin typically figure in this
appraisal, just as they do for Graziano, the
question of consciousness is in fact a
substitute for the name of Freud. With this
amendment the whole matter is given an
altogether different cast. Where Copernicus,
Darwin and Freud are often invoked as a trio
so as to question our pretension’s of knowing,
with Graziano’s substitution of the subject of
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consciousness an inversion occurs by means
of which the three “big questions” are made to
seemingly lock-down and confirm the truth
claims of contemporary science.
It was actually Freud himself who first
made the connection between his own
endeavor and that of Copernicus and Darwin.
This association was ostensibly forged at the
time so as to explain why psychoanalysis was
failing to gain widespread scientific approval.
Freud (1916-17) contends that in recognizing
the existence of the unconscious:
Human megalomania will have suffered
its third and most wounding blow from
the psychological research of the present
time which seeks to prove that the ego is
not even master in its own house, but
must content itself with scanty
information of what is going on
unconsciously in its mind. (p. 285)
While the kernel of this observation may well
be of fundamental significance, it is
undoubtedly the case that for Freud and his
followers the apparent recognition of the ego’s
having been de-seated was itself sometimes
made basis for its very reinstatement upon the
throne of reason—in the field’s early history,
the initiatory nature of a classical training
analysis coupled with a technical emphasis on
the role of interpretation served to promote the
notion that the elect few had achieved some
form of special insight not available to the
general public. It is obviously ironic that in
taking aim at the “megalomania” of others,
Freud is nevertheless quite ready to place his
own genius alongside that of Copernicus and
Darwin.
The relationship between selfhumbling insight and a resultant tendency
towards self-aggrandizing inflation has
significantly marked the wider discourse of
depth psychology. In the field’s early history,
this tendency can be discerned in the

distinction between psychoanalysis portrayed
as an objective science associated with the
practice of medicine, and psychoanalysis
positioned as an emancipatory endeavor
fundamentally concerned with the value of the
individual (e.g. Fromm, 1955; Lindner, 1953;
Marcuse, 1966). The former trend is reflected
in the extent to which psychoanalytic
discourse was, for a time, able to influence the
practice of psychiatry in the English-speaking
world; while the latter tendency was less
formally institutionalized and more
fragmentary, often being made subject to
ostracization from the medically oriented
mainstream.
The clinical practice of
psychoanalysis at the present time is still
struggling to recover from the consequences
of the field’s inability to contend with the
tensions implied by this theoretical split.
If, in keeping with Graziano’s (2014)
position, the consciousness literature reflects,
in considerable degree, the efforts of
contemporary science to conquer the mind, it
has also been informed by tendencies that are
often quite opposed to this. In a significant
editorial from the Journal of Consciousness
Studies, Goguen et. al. (1997) contrast those
fields of inquiry often construed by the
mainstream as “kosher” (philosophy,
neurobiology, and cognitive science) with a
much broader range of paradigms commonly
deemed “taboo.”
This split is very much
reminiscent of the one discernible in the
history of depth psychology.
While the
“kosher” disciplines have about them a sense
of institutional acceptability reminiscent of the
particular sensibility pursued by classical
analysis during its heyday, those fields of
inquiry deemed “taboo” are reflective of much
that was disavowed.
The emancipatory/
hermeneutic approach to analysis has come to
be associated in considerable degree with
ideas from phenomenology (e.g. Atwood &
Stolorow, 1993; Csordas, 2012; Nissim-Sabat,
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2011)—a strand of philosophical discourse
which has also exerted significant left-field
influence in the consciousness literature (e.g.
Chalmers, 1997; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012;
Gibson, 1986).
Additionally, a series of
resonances to the term “consciousness” might
be considered that relate to critical theory and
have links with the depth psychological
tradition both by way of Lacanian thinking,
and in terms of the relationship between
interpersonal psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt
school (Noerr, 2002): the Marxian notion of
false consciousness (Engels, 1893),
Durkheim’s (1893) collective consciousness,
the more contemporary notion of popular
consciousness, and the consciousness raising
of American feminists and Civil Rights
activists in the 1960s (Sarachild, 1973). Each
of these adoptions of the term connect it with
q u e s t i o n s o f i d e o l o g y a n d p o w e r.
Furthermore, we might consider the
underlying influence of several other usages
that are particularly associated with
transpersonal approaches to the psyche: the
notion of higher consciousness which (like
“the unconscious") has roots in German
idealism (Ffytche, 2012), and altered states of
consciousness, a notion popularized by the
psychologist Charles Tart (1969).
The extent to which the term
“consciousness” has been associated with both
political and spiritual emancipation suggests
that there is much at stake where this notion
has captured popular attention within the
frame of neuroscience and the attempt to
“explain” consciousness.
What might the
implications be if popular opinion is
increasingly being shaped by the notion that
consciousness doesn’t exist? That such a
notion might come to gain widespread
currency seems absurd, and yet in the present
intellectual climate is eminently conceivable.
Just as moderns look back bemusedly upon
the how many angels on the head of a pin

philosophizing of Medieval scholasticism, it
may be that in years to come the idea that
highly intelligent people invested considerable
energy trying to refute the existence of
consciousness may seem similarly mystifying.
For the time being, though, the handling of
this question has much resting upon it. The
extent to which the debates around
consciousness serve to affirm (or deny)
biological reductionism, is also the extent to
which these debates implicitly support (or
challenge) psychiatry in being able to continue
basing its assumptions on ideological
constructs which favor the financial interests
of the pharmaceutical and insurance
industries, not to mention the stability of the
wider infrastructure which depends upon the
mass adherence to present modes of
functioning.
Clearly the neurological
approach to consciousness needn’t imply this
kind of reductionism. Popularizers like Sacks
(1985) and Ramachandran (2011)—both of
whom have been openly hospitable to
psychoanalytic thinking—have stressed deep
respect for the limits of neurology as a
hermeneutic for lived experience. While a
hardline neuroscientific attempt to explain
consciousness objectively will more than
likely find no value in psychodynamic
thinking, in recent years a significant
movement within the psychoanalytic
community has developed out of a desire to
reconcile psychoanalytic theory with brain
science.
Neuropsychoanalysis seeks to
establish links between brain physiology and
psychoanalytic practice, and argues that
perspectives in terms of both mind and brain
are equally important in advancing clinical
practice (Panksepp & Solms, 2012). This
movement has attracted considerable support
form the field of neuroscience. In the subtitle
of a recent article, Damasio (2012) is explicit
i n a rg u i n g t h a t p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d
neuroscience constitute a “natural alliance.”
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Meanwhile, Nobel laureate neuropsychiatrist
Eric Kandel (2012) has voiced a belief that
psychoanalysis “still stands as perhaps the
most influential and coherent view of mental
activity that we have” (p. 47). In light of this
kind of support, it seems reasonable to argue
that there is something of a lacuna in the
consciousness literature with regards to the
absence of a serious engagement with
contemporary depth psychology.
From a clinical point of view, the
manner in which the debates around
consciousness shape public opinion raises
important ethical questions. It cannot be
emphasized sufficiently that these debates
have tangible consequences for human lives
(Brown, 2015).
While in recent years
educated opinion has tended to concern itself
with the threat of fundamentalism, the rise of
this tendency in the West might be seen partly
as an expression of the reductiveness of
contemporary psychiatry that has arguably
sewn the seeds, both culturally and clinically,
for the emergence of just such a climate.
Perhaps the carefully justified cynicism of
eliminative materialism (Churchland, 1999)
perceives in fundamentalist religion both the
reaction to, and the distorted reflection of this
movement’s own dogmatic literalism (e.g.
Blackmore, 2007; Dawkins, 2008; Dennett,
2007). In the face of advancing neuroscience,
for those following in the tradition of Ryle
(1949) who would refute the existence of
mind itself, the claim effectively comes to be
made that the individual has no form of
privileged access to the nature of their own
personhood. A position of this sort clearly has
deep-seated political implications.
When
medical science attempts to secure this degree
of authority for itself, perhaps we might look
to employ some of the cynicism of the
eliminative materialists, and ask how it comes
to pass that mainstream academia has given so
much credence to this kind of thinking in the

first place? Recent publications by Whitaker
(2010) and Watters (2010) have explored the
extent to which reductive approaches to mind
are supported by economic and ideological
factors influencing the production of
knowledge. The working clinician encounters
the consequences of these pressures on a daily
basis. If a significant aspect of the early work
with patients falls within the scope of psychoeducation, this task becomes all the more
challenging the more deeply entrenched does
the culture of biological reductivism become.
While psycho-education in the context of a
psychodynamic treatment seeks to empower
the patient to take their own experiences more
seriously, objections to the legitimacy of “folk
psychology” have precisely the opposite
intention, focusing on claims that the common
person is not sufficiently educated as to be
able to experience themselves in a correct
fashion (Fletcher, 1995).
Where Dennett
(2001) is explicit in his belief that we are not
the authors of our own lives, it is unclear in
what extent he experiences himself on this
basis. A great many people seeking therapy
seemingly do so precisely as a consequence of
their not being able to attain a sense of selfagency, yet the present psychiatric paradigm
appears only to reinforce this. Clearly any
form of substantive social change has as a
prerequisite a basic sense of trust in one’s own
experience, as opposed to a reliance on the
assumed authority of others.
Washburn
(2012) argues that, despite a range of
criticisms directed towards the psychoanalytic
conception of the ego, admitting necessary
revisions the notion itself can still be
considered fundamentally sound. Any critique
of “homunculus" theories of mind that fail to
engage not only with the political
implications, but also with the vast body of
clinical literature which would seem to
correlate the sense of an inner person with the
capacity to live a more fulfilling life, appears
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to have dangerously overlooked much of
seeming importance.
In the study of consciousness, one of
the most pressing arguments in favor of
retaining psychodynamic models of mind may
be constituted by way of the ethical questions
emphasized as a consequence of engagement
in clinical practice—that is, that the notion of
an unconscious mind remains deeply
significant as the basis for a nomenclature
emphasizing the limits of human reason and,
by extension, offers the basis for an approach
to the mind that is pluralistic and demonstrates
a fundamental respect for uncertainty. The
consciousness literature, however, has given
little consideration to the relevance of
psychodynamic thought, and where the topic
has been broached it has usually been only
with the passing intent of critiquing narrowly
Freudian conceptions of the unconscious. In
this connection, the claim most often
encountered is that the notion of an
unconscious mind is demonstrably unsound,
since for something to function on the level of
thought it must by definition be potentially
available to thinking. The earliest objection of
this sort appears to have been put forth by
philosopher-psychologist Franz Brentano,
who was also the first theorist to posit
intentionality as the defining feature of all
mental phenomena. Writing prior to Freud,
Brentano (1874/1995) already seeks to contest
the notion of an unconscious by stating that
every mental act is by definition in some sense
conscious. Having made this claim, however,
he nevertheless recognizes that mental acts
can be of different intensities, with mental
events of a lower intensity coming to be
experienced as if unconscious. William James
(1890) argues similarly that all mentation is
conscious, but that much of it occurs too
quickly to make an impression on memory.
Like Brentano, philosopher of consciousness
Jean Gebser (1984) also disputes the

unconscious in favor of an approach
conceived in terms of conscious intensities.
More recently, Searle (1994) has again
suggested that the notion of an unthinkable
thought is not coherent—by way of what he
terms the connection principle, he argues that
unconscious mental states must be potentially
available to the conscious mind.
The commonplace assumption is that
thoughts come into being and have
consequence only in the act of thinking them;
that the existence of thoughts is dependent on
our thinking. But from whence does this
particular thought arise? Whatever one makes
of Jaynes’ (1976) theory of the bicameral
mind, his work offers ample evidence of the
ways in which human-beings may have not
always experienced their thoughts as their
own. Clearly the notion of our ideas being
caused by us and thus reasonably claimed as
our own private property has a complex and
multifaceted history. What we’ve come to
experience as an unbreakable linkage between
our thoughts and our thinking doesn’t
necessarily seem to have been experienced as
such by people in prior times. Speaking of an
encounter in imagination with the biblical
figure of Elijah, Jung (1989) reports:
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thoughts as events, as phenomena. (p.
95)
This passage is reminiscent of postKleinian analyst Wilfred Bion’s fundamental
claim that thoughts exist prior to our being
able to think them. For Bion, the mental
apparatus develops out of the need to find
containment for thoughts that are, at the
outset, unthinkable. Grotstein (1988) suggests
that Bion might reformulate Descartes' cogito
ergo sum as: “I am, therefore I have thoughts
without a thinker which demand a mind to
think about them” (p. 15). While Jung and
Bion both call into question whether ideas can
be considered inherently the possession of our
minds, the seemingly insoluble dependence
between thought and thinking has also come
to be questioned from the opposite angle, by
way of theoretical engagement with mystical
and meditative states. Forman (1997) has
outlined what he terms Pure Consciousness
Events, wherein awareness is sustained
without object. If thinking can be present
without a thought, why not thoughts without a
thinker?
While acknowledging the necessary
explanatory power attendant to the conception
of an unconscious, Searle (1994) complains
that the notion exhibits too much
“unclarity” (p. 151). In so far as the notion of
an unconscious mind has been adopted as a
placeholder for the unspeakable, however, this
seems only appropriate.
Given this
acknowledged lack of clarity around the
subject matter, it is striking that Searle
nevertheless translates Freud into terms that
do an obvious disservice to the complexity of
Freud’s work. In particular, the notion that
unconscious states can be understood as—to
draw from one of Searle’s own analogies—
fish that appear quite the same above water as
they do in the depths, is a significant
misrepresentation of psychoanalytic thought.

Consider, for instance, the following passage
from Freud (1900) on the waking recall of
dreams:
There is no doubt, then, that it is our
normal thinking that is the psychical
agency which approaches the content of
dreams with a demand that it must be
intelligible, which subjects it to a first
interpretation and which consequently
produces a complete misunderstanding
of it. (p. 500)
For Searle (1994), the nature of the
unconscious can only be defined as “the
ontology of a neurophysiology capable of
generating the conscious” (p. 172).
In
response to this statement, Chessick (2001)
claims that Freud only speaks of unconscious
processes as if they were already mental, and
to read him otherwise is a distortion (p. 671).
On this basis, Chessick suggests that Freud’s
position might be a good deal more
compatible with Searle’s than Searle himself
realizes. While there may be some substance
to this claim, Chessick’s argument might be
criticized for not adequately recognizing the
extent to which Freud’s psychology parted
ways with biology, and it certainly offers no
defense for the positions of figures like Bion
and Jung (Brown, 2014). A more radical
response might go further, and point out that
the assumption that consciousness is entirely
dependent on the activity of the brain is itself
an unproven assumption. Rosenbaum (2012)
has set forth a distinction between
consciousness of which we are conscious and
consciousness of which we are unconscious.
She justifies the claim that consciousness is
still present even when we are—according to
all neurological markers—unconscious, by
citing studies that indicate how individuals
under deep anesthesia or in cardiac arrest have
subsequently been able to recall impressions
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of events taking place in the operating room
(p. 273). While recognizing the extent to
which the phenomenology of the mind is
clearly linked with the functioning of the
brain, Grof (1992) observes that the
assumption that consciousness has its origin in
the brain is a metaphysical article of faith, and
not a proven scientific fact. He offers the
following analogy:
A good television repair person can look
at the particular distortion of the picture
or sound of a television set and tell us
exactly what is wrong with it and which
parts must be replaced to make it work
properly again. No one would see this
as proof that the set itself was
responsible for the programs we see
when we turn it on. (p. 5)
Contrary to Chessick’s (2001) defense
of the Freudian unconscious as being
compatible with Searle’s apparent objection to
it, Freud’s (1900) statement that the
unconscious constitutes the “true psychical
reality” (p. 613) would appear explicit in
insisting upon a psychological bedrock as the
proper basis for approaching psychic life, and
not one that is to be reduced to the chemistry
of the brain. While Freud never seems to have
lost hope that his theories might eventually be
corroborated by neuroscience, his approach to
the mind is an avowedly psychological one.
By contrast, Searle’s (1994) significant claim
that consciousness is ontologically subjective
seems not to have penetrated the substance of
his own thinking. In his concern to avoid
slipping into idealism, Searle in fact states that
the distinction he draws between intrinsic
intentionality (that which is attributed to “true”
mental states) and as-if intentionality (that
which only gives the impression of being
intentional without, it is claimed, being so) is
necessary since “the price of giving it up

would be that everything would become
mental” (p. 156).
In keeping with this
metaphysical commitment, Searle claims that
attributions to the unconscious are not
intended to be taken metaphorically; that they
“lose their explanatory power if we do not take
them literally” (p. 156).
Not apparently
considering that what a person experiences as
“literal” might itself be subjectively
determined, Searle posits his own assumptions
as universally applicable and proceeds on the
basis that “literally” can only mean having
intrinsic intentionality which, by his line of
reasoning, comes to mean being objectively
true on the basis of neurophysiology. But if
consciousness is considered ontologically
subjective, what sense does it make to insist
that the explanatory power of the unconscious
rests upon its being regarded as objectively
valid? While emergence theory appears to
offer the promise of providing a scientific
basis for what Freeman (2003) dubs
“nonreductive physicalism,” the scientific
respectability of this notion would seem to rest
upon ignoring how the emergent property
[consciousness] of the system subtending it
[the brain] is the very means by which the
system subtending it comes to be postulated as
Searle’s (2002)
such in the first place2.
vigorous resistance to being labeled a property
dualist is indicative of an attempt to stave off
the metaphysical problems that clearly
threaten when one takes an emergentist
position on the subject of consciousness.
If we are to follow Freud’s claim that
the unconscious is the true psychical reality,
then the extent to which something can be
thought “literally” true can only be posed as a
question of faith. The decisive turning point
in this respect was Freud’s rejection of the
theory of infantile seduction in favor of his
For an examination of how this problem ex‐
presses itself in the psychodynamic literature,
see Brown (2013).

2
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later belief that the notion of a “real world”
event of this sort was in most cases produced
by a way of an infantile wish fulfillment. The
shift thus implied was to place primary
emphasis on the fantasy of the patient over
and above any question of what the clinician
might imagine had “really” happened (Freud,
1916-17, p. 368).
In recognizing the
psychological primacy of the patient’s fantasy,
objections to the Cartesian theatre start to
seem moot, and might more reasonably be
considered demonstrative of the limits of
physicalism than of the need for a more
radical skepticism. Dennett’s (1992) claim
that the self is the center of a narrative fiction
can be regarded as quite correct, but his
implicit assumption that a fiction doesn’t have
its own ontological gravity is the reflection of
a characterologically determined article of
faith in the primacy of matter. Refuting the
Cartesian theater on the evidence of
experimental psychology makes little sense
since, as Chalmers (1995) has argued, the
phenomenon itself remains.
Likewise, to
criticize homunculus theories on the basis of
an infinite regress is only legitimate should the
notion be put forward in an effort to “explain”
consciousness, not if it is used to describe (and
loosely at that) something of the manner in
which many people introspectively experience
themselves. To remain in a literalistic mode
and insist upon asking who thinks for the
homunculus, is surely to have missed the
point.
Approaching the topic of
consciousness with integrity, we have to
contend with the extent to which the field’s
subject matter is unavoidably implicated in the
act of attempting to study it. Jung (1947)
refers to this struggle as the absence of an
Archimedean point of reference (p. 216). In
the early history of psychology, this
fundamental problem was referred to as “the
personal equation.” The only way that the

discipline of psychology was ultimately able
to respond to this challenge while maintaining
its tenuous credentials as a science, was to act
as though having obviated the personal factor
altogether by focusing only on observable
behavior. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the
recent re-emergence of consciousness as an
acceptable topic of academic study took place
outside the domain of psychology proper;
a r i s i n g , p e r h a p s n e c e s s a r i l y, a s a
transdisciplinary phenomenon. In so far as the
metaphysics of Baconian science come to hold
sway exclusively, then the field is perhaps
destined to swallow itself.
If the founding act of neuroanatomy
can be thought constituted in the cleaving of
right hemisphere from left, then it seems only
appropriate given the recurring significance
that the motif of a division into two has been
observed to exhibit in the world’s creation
mythology (von Franz, 1972). It might further
be noted that in the very act of division
signifying the field’s creation, the left brain is
implicitly privileged from the outset. Under
the influence of this kind of thinking, the
fledgling field of consciousness studies has
been considerably preoccupied with the
question of whether that which the discipline
purports to examine can even be said to exist
in the first place. Might this tendency reflect
an ironic manifestation of what Freud referred
to as “the return of the repressed”? As the
notion of the unconscious continues to go
largely unacknowledged within the field, is
that which is unconscious in consciousness
studies fast coming to be the notion of
consciousness itself? The present paper has
sought to show that efforts to redress the
balance of this conversation might be aided by
means of a more direct engagement with the
ethical, clinical, and theoretical dimensions of
psychodynamic discourse.
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